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DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
WHY STATE FARM WON’T BE THE LAST WORD
Laura J. Hines*
During the past fifteen years, the U.S. Supreme Court has decided
no fewer than seven cases in which it was asked to overturn punitive
damage awards on a variety of constitutional grounds.1 Over the course
of these decisions, the Due Process Clause has clearly emerged as the
norm favored by the Court to test the procedures utilized by courts in
imposing punitive damages, to evaluate the appropriateness of awarding
such damages, and to calibrate the correct size of the award in a
particular case.2
The tightening of constitutional constraints on the legitimacy and
permissible size of the punitive damage awards follows a wellestablished pattern of federal oversight of state court decision-making
that began shortly after the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.3 In its
examination of state punitive damage awards, as with its prior pattern of
due process inquiries, the Court first addressed purely procedural

*

Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas. My sincerest thanks to Chris
Drahozal, Rob Glicksman, John Lungstrum and David Partlett for their helpful comments and
suggestions. Thanks, too, to the University of Kansas for its generous research support.
1. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003); Cooper
Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559 (1996); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994); TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991);
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
2. See, e.g., BMW, 517 U.S. at 559; Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages
(With Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2087 (1998) (“Hence a
majority of recent Justices . . . have argued that the Due Process Clause requires constraints on jury
discretion that will provide fair notice to potential defendants and limit the role of arbitrary or
irrelevant factors.”).
3. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Justice Field’s expansive views of the
procedural and substantive limits the Due Process Clause imposes upon state authority marked the
start of a long and somewhat tortured tradition of Supreme Court intervention into the details of
state court processes and decisions. Modern decisions reviewing state actions for due process
violations commonly employ a balancing analysis under the rubric of fundamental fairness.
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concerns,4 then advanced into a substantive consideration of the
constitutional adequacy of the principles or standards which cabin the
discretion state courts exercise in reaching their punitive damages
determinations.5
Although the primary purposes they serve may have changed over
time, the functions of punitive damages today are commonly agreed to
be the punishment and deterrence of extraordinarily wrongful, willful
conduct that is variously characterized as malicious, outrageous, wanton,
fraudulent or in deliberate disregard of the interests of others.6 For
almost all of the 125 years since the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted, punitive damages were regarded as so firmly imbedded in
American legal culture that no special procedures or precise rules of law
were deemed necessary to constrain state courts’ imposition of such
“exemplary” damages.7 This laissez faire attitude toward possible
constitutional infirmities of state law and procedures regarding punitive
damages has rapidly been abandoned by the Supreme Court over the
past fifteen years,8 and a new paradigm, governing state court punitive
damages awards and federal review of them, is in the process of being
established.9
Positing that punitive damages today are more frequent and much
4. See, e.g., Haslip, 499 U.S. at 1 (examining procedures by which the trial court awarded
punitive damages and the appellate courts reviewed punitive damages).
5. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 559; see also Sunstein et al., supra note 2, at 2087 (noting that “a
majority of the Supreme Court has converged” on the proposition that punitive damages awards
unconstitutionally violate the “substantive dimension” of the Due Process Clause “when they are
grossly excessive”).
6. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 9-10 (5th ed. 1984). But see Anthony J. Sebok, What
Did Punitive Damages Do? Why Misunderstanding the History of Punitive Damages Matters
Today, 78 CHI-KENT L. REV. 163, 163-64 (2003) (noting the “variety of plausible purposes” for
punitive damages, including compensation); David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview:
Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 373-74 (1994) (explaining that “[a]lthough
most courts refer only to ‘punishment’ and ‘deterrence’ as rationales for [punitive] damages, this
masks the variety of specific functions that punitive damages actually serve,” including such
additional functions as education, compensation and law enforcement).
7. As a long-established part of the common law of torts, due process was thought to inhere
in punitive damage awards because of the fact that the state practices and procedures for awarding
punitive damages in appropriate cases antedated the inclusion of the Due Process Clause in the Bill
of Rights and its subsequent application to state actions through the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 32-34 (Scalia, J., concurring).
8. See Susan R. Klein, The Discriminatory Application of Substantive Due Process: A Tale
of Two Vehicles, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 453, 483 (decrying the “conspicuous absen[ce]” of any Court
“deference to historical practice and legislative prerogatives” in its punitive damages due process
jurisprudence).
9. See Sunstein et al., supra note 2, at 2093 (presciently describing the post-BMW “project
of creating a detailed form of ‘constitutional common law’ to control punitive damages” that the
Court might embark upon and, in any event, has “practically force[d] lower courts to begin to do”).
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larger than in the recent past,10 the Court has repeatedly found it
necessary to remind states of the unique nature of punitive damages and
the heightened care with which such awards must be imposed.11 Unlike
compensatory damages, which serve to “redress the concrete loss”
suffered by the plaintiff, punitive damages operate as “quasi-criminal”
fines12 imposed without the protections to which a defendant would be
entitled in any criminal proceeding.13
While acknowledging states’ legitimate authority to award such
damages,14 the Court has nevertheless developed increasingly exacting
due process standards by which courts must assess punitive damages
awards. Its most recent pronouncements on this subject, in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, reflect a Court doggedly
determined to constrain state punitive damages awards. State Farm
significantly curtails the scope of defendant conduct that a state may
subject to punitive liability, and pointedly clarifies the rigorous threeguidepost analysis the Court set forth in its landmark decision in BMW
of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 15 offering highly structured guidance on
the outer limits of punitive damages awards.16
Part I of this article will trace the development of the evolving
principles and requirements the Court is imposing on state awards of
punitive damages, identifying notable undercurrents within the Court
regarding this new and expanding application of the Due Process Clause.
Part II will present a detailed analysis of State Farm Mutual Automobile
10. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1982).
11. The Court has reversed or vacated the last four punitive damages cases it has considered.
See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003); Cooper Indus., Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559
(1996); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994); see also TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance
Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 475 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]ime and again, this Court and
its Members have expressed concern about punitive damages awards ‘run wild,’ inexplicable on any
basis but caprice or passion.”); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113
YALE L.J. 347, 352 (2003).
12. See Cooper, 532 U.S. at 432; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
13. See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1520 (“Although [punitive damages] awards serve the same
purposes as criminal penalties, defendants subjected to punitive damages in civil cases have not
been accorded the protections applicable in a criminal proceeding. This increases our concerns over
the imprecise manner in which punitive damages systems are administered.”).
14. See id.; BMW, 517 U.S. at 568 (“Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a
State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.”).
15. BMW, 517 U.S. at 559. The three guideposts enumerated by the Court were: 1) “the
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct,” id. at 575; 2) the awards “ratio to the actual
harm inflicted on the plaintiff,” id. at 580; and 3) a comparison of the “punitive damages award and
the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct,” id. at 583.
16. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. 1513; see also infra notes 82-115 and accompanying text.
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Insurance Co. v. Campbell, which represents the Court’s most ambitious
attempt yet to provide guidance to states on how to approach the
imposition of punitive damages and how to assess the appropriate size
thereof. Finally, Part III of this article will examine recent lower court
cases involving contested punitive damage awards as a means to identify
and discuss several important issues left unresolved by State Farm.
These issues include the relative significance of the “reprehensibility”
factors, determining the appropriate ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages, the relevance of a defendant’s wealth in calculating punitive
damages, and the aggregate punishment problem.
I. SUPREME COURT PUNITIVE DAMAGES JURISPRUDENCE
PRE-STATE FARM
In 1989, the Court first signaled its willingness to consider due
process limitations on punitive damages in Browning-Ferris Industries
of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.17 While Browning-Ferris rejected
the argument that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment
applied in the context of punitive damages awards,18 the Court expressly
reserved for future examination the argument that a state’s imposition of
punitive damages awards may violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.19
In 1991, in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance v. Haslip, the Court for
the first time squarely addressed a due process challenge to a punitive
damages award.20 Acknowledging that the Due Process Clause does
indeed impose substantive constraints on the amount of punitive
damages, the Court nevertheless concluded that the specific award at
issue was neither excessive nor arbitrarily imposed.21 The Haslip
opinion was devoted primarily to an assessment of the procedural
protections Alabama had in place to guard against excessive or arbitrary
punitive damages awards.22 As for excessiveness, the Court found that
17. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
18. Id. at 263-64. Several scholars have contended that the Excessive Fines Clause ought to
apply to such awards. See, e.g., Stephen R. McAllister, A Pragmatic Approach to the Eighth
Amendment and Punitive Damages, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 761 (1995). This is particularly relevant in
light of the “quasi-criminal” nature of punitive damages. See, e.g., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A
Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 151 (1986).
19. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 277; see also id. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(emphasizing that the Court’s decision in Browning-Ferris “leaves the door open” for future due
process challenges).
20. Pacific Mut. Life Ins., Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 24 (1991).
21. Id. at 23.
22. The Court cited in particular Alabama’s judicial review process, which “ensures that
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the four-to-one (4:1) ratio of punitive to compensatory damages
reflected by the award at issue placed it “close to the line” of
constitutional propriety, but passed constitutional muster.23
Two years after Haslip, the Court considered yet another due
process challenge to a punitive damages award. In TXO Production
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., the Court approved a punitive
damages award even more disproportionately related to the amount of
compensatory damages.24 In approving the award’s 526:1 ratio, the
Court interpreted its proportionality analysis to permit state courts to
consider not only the actual harm caused as a result of defendant’s
conduct but also the “potential harm” to plaintiff, and even the “possible
harm to other victims that might have resulted if similar future behavior
were not deterred.”25 The Court upheld the award in TXO because of
such potential harm, finding that if the defendant’s fraudulent scheme
had succeeded, the plaintiffs would have suffered far greater economic
harm.26
Justice O’Connor wrote a lengthy and scathing dissenting opinion
in TXO, decrying the Court’s abandonment of its promise in Haslip “that
punitive damages awards would receive sufficient constitutional
scrutiny” to protect against excessive or arbitrary awards.27 In
particular, Justice O’Connor rebuked the Court for its failure to provide
adequate guidance in determining the excessiveness of a punitive
damages award, and its refusal to identify even “a single guidepost to
help other courts find their way through [an] area”28 so lacking in
“objective criteria.”29 Justice O’Connor’s dissent offered several such
criteria on the question of excessiveness,30 including “the relationship
between the punitive damages award and compensatory damages,” and
comparison of the award to legislatively designated penalties and to

punitive damages awards are not grossly out of proportion to the severity of the offense and have
some understandable relationship to compensatory damages.” Id. at 22.
23. Id. at 23.
24. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993).
25. Id. at 460.
26. Id. at 462. The Court also found significant the fact that TXO’s conduct toward the
plaintiffs was “part of a larger pattern of fraud” affecting others. Id.
27. Id. at 472-73 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). In Justice O’Connor’s view, the “monstrous[ly]”
excessive award in TXO was directly attributable to the prejudicial use at trial of evidence
demonstrating TXO’s tremendous wealth, compounded by an emphasis on its status as a nonresident corporation. Id. at 493.
28. Id. at 480.
29. Id. at 483.
30. TXO, 509 U.S. at 481.
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other punitive damages awards for similar conduct.”31
In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, the next foray into the world of
punitive damages, the Court struck down a provision of the Oregon
Constitution that prohibited judicial review of the excessiveness of a
punitive damages awards unless the reviewing court found “no evidence
to support any punitive damages at all.”32 The Court held that the Due
Process Clause required meaningful judicial review of punitive damages
awards, emphasizing the crucial safeguarding function judicial review
serves in protecting defendants against the “acute danger of arbitrary
deprivation of property.”33
Only two years later, in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the
Court for the first time reversed an award of punitive damages on the
ground that it was unconstitutionally excessive under the Due Process
Clause, and articulated a three-part excessiveness analysis for lower
courts to follow.34 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens explained
that the Due Process Clause requires states to provide defendants
adequate notice not only of the conduct that might subject them to
liability for punitive damages, but also the severity of any penalty
imposed as a result of that conduct.35 A state’s failure to provide such
notice, resulting in an unconstitutionally excessive punitive damages
award, can be established by analysis of three “guideposts” set forth in
the Court’s opinion.36 The first (and most important) guidepost requires
courts to evaluate “the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s
conduct.”37 The second guidepost focuses on the ratio between punitive
and compensatory damages, seeking to ensure some degree of
proportionality.38 The final excessiveness guidepost compares the
31. Id. With respect to the Court’s potential harm rationale for approving the “shockingly”
disproportionate award, Justice O’Connor warned that interpreting “potential harm” to include harm
to all possible present and future victims threatens to render meaningless any constraint on punitive
damages. Id. at 484-85 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Virtually any tort, however, can cause millions
of dollars of harm if imposed against a sufficient number of victims.”). In any event, Justice
O’Connor concluded that the potential harm rationale could not sustain the award at issue because
neither the jury nor the lower courts had meaningfully considered it. Id.
32. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 426-27 (1994).
33. Id. at 432. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented in Oberg on the
ground that Oregon’s judicial review procedures did not violate “the due process limits indicated in
Haslip and TXO.” Id. at 438 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
34. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
35. Id. at 574.
36. Two of these “guideposts” bear more than a little resemblance to the “objective criteria”
Justice O’Connor urged courts to consider in her TXO dissent. See supra notes 29-31 and
accompanying text.
37. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575.
38. Id. at 581.
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amount of punitive damages to any “civil or criminal penalties that could
be imposed for comparable misconduct.”39
In BMW, Alabama had imposed the $2 million punitive damages
award at issue against BMW for its failure to disclose to a plaintiff that
his car had been repainted prior to its sale. As an initial matter, Justice
Stevens addressed the scope of defendant conduct that a state may
legitimately seek to punish through an award of punitive damages. The
jury in BMW, according to Justice Stevens, had improperly calculated
the punitive damages award on the basis of harm to every purchaser
nationwide who BMW failed to inform of the pre-sale repainting – even
though such nondisclosure was expressly lawful in many states.40
Justice Stevens emphasized the constitutional significance of the trial
court’s error: “We think it follows from these principles of state
sovereignty and comity that . . . Alabama does not have the power . . . to
punish BMW for conduct that was lawful where it occurred and that had
no impact on Alabama or its residents.”41 The Court left for another day,
however, the question of whether a state may base a punitive damages
award on unlawful conduct in other states.42
While acknowledging that the Alabama Supreme Court had already
limited the punitive damages award to punish BMW only for its conduct
in Alabama (remitting the award from $4 million to $2 million), the
Court held that even the remitted amount violated due process,
concluding that the excessiveness of the award could be demonstrated
under all three guideposts. First, with respect to reprehensibility, the
Court found it significant that BMW’s conduct was lawful in other states
and had not been determined to be unlawful before the plaintiff’s case.
This indicated a low degree of culpability compared to a defendant who
knowingly and repeatedly engaged in wrongful activity. Further,
BMW’s conduct resulted in purely economic harm and did not threaten
the health or safety of its consumers, all of which suggested a lower
degree of reprehensibility.43
Next, while the Court described the ratio analysis as a “significant”
part of the excessiveness equation with a “long pedigree,” it declined to
set any definite ratio by which to evaluate punitive damage awards:
“[W]e have consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line
39. Id. at 583.
40. Id. at 572.
41. Id. at 572-73; see id. at 610 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (agreeing with majority that punitive
damages award could not be based on out of state conduct).
42. BMW, 517 U.S. at 574 n.20; see infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
43. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575-80.
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[between acceptable and unacceptable ratios] is marked by a simple
mathematical formula.”44 The ratio of a “breathtaking” 500:1 ($2
million in punitive damages compared to $4,000 in compensatory
damages) in the case at hand, however, led the Court to “raise a
suspicious judicial eyebrow.”45 Further, the Court found none of the
circumstances that might justify such a high ratio to be present in
plaintiff’s case.46
In a frustratingly inexact footnote alluding to others harmed by
BMW’s conduct, the Court opined that even if the plaintiff’s
compensatory damages could be extrapolated to each of the 14 Alabama
consumers affected by BMW’s nondisclosure ($4,000 x 14 = $56,000),
the resulting ratio of punitive damages to total Alabama harm would still
be an (apparently) unacceptable 35:1.47 Such reasoning failed to shed
any helpful light on the highly contentious subject of punitive damages
in the context of conduct that affects a large number of people, as in
mass torts.48
As in TXO, the Court acknowledged that a proper evaluation of the
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages may require
consideration of the harm that did not but might have resulted from
defendant’s conduct, referred to as the “potential” harm to the victim.49
In BMW, however, the $4,000 compensatory damages awarded to the
plaintiff for diminution of the value of his repainted car represented the
only possible harm he could have sustained as a result of BMW’s
conduct. Although the Court in BMW also alluded to the fact that no
“other BMW purchaser was threatened with any additional potential
harm,”50 it did not refer to the broader language of TXO that suggested
consideration of “possible harm to other victims that might have resulted

44. Id. at 582; see also Sunstein et al., supra note 2, at 2092 (concluding that after BMW,
“striking ratios are not (and should not be) decisive” in determining excessiveness of a punitive
damages award).
45. Id. at 583.
46. Id. at 582. Such high ratios might be tolerated, the Court explained, “if, for example, a
particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages,” or where “the
injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of the noneconomic harm might have been difficult to
determine.” Id.
47. Id. at 582 n.35. In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer repeatedly refers to $56,000 as
the relevant amount of “past, present, or likely future harm” caused by BMW’s conduct. Id. at 58990 (Breyer, J., concurring).
48. See infra notes 189-198 and accompanying text.
49. BMW, 517 U.S. at 581 (citing TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509
U.S. 443, 460 (1993)).
50. Id. at 582.
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if similar future behavior were not deterred.”51
Finally, in its application of the third guidepost, the Court in BMW
considered the $2,000 civil penalty that Alabama could have imposed
based on BMW’s conduct, and noted that similar penalties in other states
reached only $10,000. In light of these statutes, the Court concluded
that neither Alabama nor any other state had provided “an out-of-state
distributor with fair notice that the first violation – or, indeed, the first 14
violations – of its provisions might subject an offender to a multimillion
dollar penalty.”52
BMW thus announced a three-guidepost test for excessiveness,
albeit in the context of a case the Court considered quite easy.53
Virtually none of the aggravating reprehensibility factors were present,
the ratio of 500:1 was astonishingly high without any of the historically
mitigating circumstances, and the comparable civil penalties Alabama
might have imposed suggested the award was “tantamount to a severe
criminal penalty” imposed without fair notice to BMW.54
Dissenting from the Court’s decision, Justice Scalia railed against
what he regarded as the illegitimate federalization of “yet another aspect
of our Nation’s legal culture (no matter how much in need of correction
it may be).”55 The Due Process Clause only guarantees “an opportunity
to contest the reasonableness of a damages judgment in state court; but
there is no federal guarantee a damages award actually be reasonable.”56
Moreover, Justice Scalia characterized the Court’s guidepost analysis as
offering no actual guidance at all.57
Justice Ginsburg also dissented in BMW, arguing that the Court
“unnecessarily and unwisely ventures [further] into territory traditionally
within the States’ domain.”58 Rightly predicting the Court’s need to
revisit this subject, Justice Ginsburg strenuously objected to the Court’s
51. TXO, 509 U.S. at 460.
52. BMW, 517 U.S. at 584.
53. See Klein, supra note 8, at 484 (criticizing BMW for “holding that somehow the Court
knows a grossly excessive punitive damage award when it sees one”).
54. The Court also warned that excessive punitive damages awards “implicate[] the federal
interest in preventing individual States from imposing undue burdens on interstate commerce” by
using “the punitive damages deterrent as a means of imposing its regulatory policies on the entire
Nation.” Id. at 585.
55. BMW, 517 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 606 (“The Court has constructed a framework that does not genuinely constrain, that
does not inform state legislatures and lower courts—that does nothing at all except confer an
artificial air of doctrinal analysis upon its essentially ad hoc determination that this particular award
of punitive damages was not ‘fair.’”).
58. Id. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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ill-conceived commitment to occasionally “correct” a state court’s
“misapplication” of BMW’s vaguely articulated guideposts.59
The Court’s opinion in BMW indeed left open several questions for
lower courts to consider.60 It failed to explore fully the scope of
defendant conduct a state may legitimately punish, both in the state
(harm to people other than the plaintiff) and outside the state (where
defendant’s out-of-state conduct is unlawful).61 Moreover, because the
Court found the award at issue to be dramatically excessive under each
guidepost, BMW offered little guidance on how to resolve harder cases.
For example, how high may a punitive damages award be when the
conduct at issue implicates the more serious reprehensibility factors
(such as indifference to health and safety),62 and what ratio short of
500:1 will raise the Court’s suspicious eyebrow?63
In the Court’s next case, Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman
Tool Group, Inc., it had little opportunity to address any of these
questions.64 Rather, the Court “reiterated the importance” of its BMW
guideposts by “mandat[ing] appellate courts to conduct de novo review
59. Id. at 612.
60. See Sunstein et al., supra note 2, at 2092 (“After BMW, and the unruly precedents on
which it is based, the law governing constitutional constraints on punitive damage awards is in a
state of considerable uncertainty and flux.”); David Crump, Evidence, Economics, and Ethics: What
Information Should Jurors Be Given to Determine the Amount of a Punitive Damage Award?, 57
MD. L. REV. 174, 213 (1998) (pointing out that BMW “only sets limits upon the states’ abilities to
assess punitive damages,” and “does not tell us the best way for a state to go about the specific
business of computing them”); see also Adam M. Gershowitz, The Supreme Court’s Backwards
Proportionality Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive Criminal Punishments and
Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 86 VA. L. REV. 1249, 1283-84 (2000) (criticizing as overly
broad the “flexibility of the BMW test [that] permits lower courts to ignore some guideposts . . . and
create others guideposts, such as the defendant’s wealth”).
61. See infra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
62. Courts after BMW grappled with the relative degree of a defendant’s reprehensibility in
cases involving conduct allegedly reflecting disregard for the health and safety of others. See, e.g.,
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1998) (discussing asbestos
manufacturer’s failure to warn of known health risks posed by product); Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co., 83 S.W.3d 483, 513 (Ky. 2002) (Cooper, J., dissenting) (finding Ford’s
manufacture of allegedly defective transmissions, that resulted in a wrongful death action,
insufficiently reprehensible to justify punitive damages award); Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 310 F.3d
461, 484 (6th Cir. 2002) (Nelson, J., dissenting in part) (doubting whether sufficiently reprehensible
conduct could be shown by Chrysler’s “recklessness in failing to equip the truck with a door latch
that would have spared [the plaintiff] the inconvenience of buckling his seatbelt”); Romo v. Ford
Motor Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 165-66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding $290 million punitive
damages award, in part, because Ford’s “malicious conduct” “placed tens of thousands of lives at
risk and actually claimed three such lives in the present case”).
63. See Gershowitz, supra note 60, at 1283-84 (2000) (contending that BMW’s “failure to
announce a maximum ratio of punitive to compensatory damages permits lower courts to make up
any ratio they see fit”).
64. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss4/4

10

Hines: Due Process Limitations on Punitive Damages
HINES2.DOC

2004]

5/14/2004 10:31 AM

DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES

789

of a trial court’s application of them to the jury’s award.”65 In an
interesting and somewhat controversial holding, the court ruled that de
novo appellate review was appropriate because a jury verdict on the
appropriateness and size of a punitive damage award was not a factual
determination for purposes of requiring a deferential review.66
Justice Stevens, writing again for the majority as he did in BMW,
also briefly addressed several indicia of the award’s excessiveness.67
First, the jury had been improperly instructed regarding the
wrongfulness of some aspects of the defendant’s conduct that were in
fact lawful. The Court urged the appellate court on remand to consider
the extent to which the jury’s (and trial court’s) assessment of
reprehensibility might have been improperly predicated on lawful
conduct.68 Second, the Court cautioned the appellate court to reexamine the trial court’s reliance on evidence regarding the “potential
harm [the plaintiff] would have suffered had [the defendant] succeeded
in its wrongful conduct,” describing the trial court’s assessment of that
harm as “unrealistic.”69 Finally, the Court expressed doubt as to whether
the defendant’s conduct would have warranted multiple assessments of
the relevant state sanction under Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act,
rather than a single statutory penalty of $25,000.70
II. EXPANDING THE BMW EXCESSIVENESS TEST: STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY V. CAMPBELL
In State Farm, the Court returned once again to the task of
enforcing due process limitations on punitive damages awards, striking
down a $145 million punitive damages award. In light of the numerous
errors committed by the Utah Supreme Court in its interpretation of
BMW’s guideposts, the Court in State Farm endeavored to provide
65. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1520 (2003) (describing
the significance of Cooper).
66. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 437-41; see also Sebok, supra note 6, at 179-80 (discussing and
critiquing this rationale).
67. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 441 (suggesting that its “own consideration of each of the three
[BMW] factors reveals a series of questionable conclusions by the District Court that may not
survive de novo review”).
68. Id. at 441.
69. Id. at 442.
70. Id. On remand, the Ninth Circuit indeed remitted the punitive damages award from $4.5
million to $500,000, based on its assessment that Cooper’s conduct was “more foolish than
reprehensible”; the 90:1 ratio was “only somewhat less ‘breathtaking’” than the one struck down in
BMW and the potential harm evidence was speculative; and Cooper’s conduct would only have
resulted in a single, modest penalty. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 285 F.3d
1146, 1149-51 (9th Cir. 2002).
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additional guidance regarding its due process excessiveness test.
Plaintiffs’ claims against State Farm, their insurance company,
stemmed from its mishandling of a lawsuit brought against Mr.
Campbell by two drivers in a head-on collision allegedly caused by Mr.
Campbell’s negligence.71 Representing Mr. Campbell, State Farm
declined offers to settle these claims for the insurance policy limits
despite a widely shared consensus that Mr. Campbell was indeed
responsible for the accident. Moreover, State Farm assured the
Campbells throughout that “their assets were safe, that they had no
liability for the accident, that [State Farm] would represent their
interests, and that they did not need to procure separate counsel.”72
After a jury verdict against Mr. Campbell for almost $200,000 more
than the settlement offers, however, State Farm refused to pay the full
judgment because it was $135,000 in excess of Mr. Campbell’s
insurance policy limits.73 Most damning, State Farm’s counsel told
plaintiffs to “put for sale signs on your property,” even though State
Farm had promised them it would protect their assets.74 While State
Farm ultimately paid the entire amount, the Campbells sued the
insurance company for bad faith, fraud and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
At trial, the Campbells introduced extensive evidence of State
Farm’s nationwide policies and practices, urging the jury to punish State
Farm for “what it’s doing across the country.”75 Indeed, in addition to
awarding the Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory damages (which
the trial court remitted to $1 million),76 the jury also awarded $145
million in punitive damages (which the trial court remitted to $25
million).77
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court’s application of the BMW
guideposts led it to reinstate the jury’s $145 million award of punitive
damages.
The Utah Supreme Court cited the high degree of
reprehensibility reflected in State Farm’s nationwide conduct, the need
71. Mr. Campbell, driving with his wife on a two-lane highway, made an unsafe pass into
oncoming traffic, causing the driver of a car in the opposite lane (Todd Ospital) to lose control. The
subsequent collision of Mr. Ospital’s car with another car driven by Robert G. Slusher, resulted in
Mr. Ospital’s death and permanent injuries to Mr. Slusher. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1517 (2003).
72. Id. at 1518 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 65 P.3d 1134, 1142
(Utah 2001)).
73. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1518.
74. Id. (quoting State Farm, 65 P.3d at 1142).
75. Id. at 1522.
76. Id. at 1519.
77. Id.
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to set a high ratio because of the likelihood such misconduct rarely will
be punished, and the significant civil and criminal penalties which could
have applied.78 The U.S. Supreme Court granted State Farm’s petition
for certiorari, characterizing as “neither close nor difficult”79 its
conclusion that the $145 million punitive damages award was excessive
under each of its BMW guideposts.
State Farm’s reprehensibility analysis offered little guidance on the
relative degrees of reprehensibility that might warrant particularly high
punitive damages awards, focusing instead on whether a defendant’s
conduct warranted any punitive liability at all. The Court emphasized
that states must presume a plaintiff has been fully compensated, and
therefore must base punitive damages awards only on conduct “so
reprehensible” that a sanction beyond compensatory damages is required
for “punishment or deterrence.”80 This cautionary reminder reflects the
Court’s rejection of any conception of punitive damages as serving
compensatory goals.81
The reprehensibility guidepost of BMW, the Court held, set forth
strict instructions for courts to consider five factors: whether a
defendant’s conduct reflects (1) “indifference to or a reckless disregard
of the health or safety of others,” (2) “intentional malice, trickery, or
deceit” (as opposed to “mere accident”), or (3) “repeated actions” (as
opposed to “an isolated incident”); (4) whether the harm inflicted was
physical or economic; and (5) whether “the target of the conduct had
financial vulnerability.”82
Without ranking the relative reprehensibility of these factors, the
Court noted that the presence of only one might not warrant punitive
liability.83 The absence of all of these factors makes any award of
The Court found the degree of
punitive damages “suspect.”84
78. Id. (citing State Farm, 65 P.3d at 1153-54).
79. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1521.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Sharkey, supra note 11, at 390 (referencing the “now all-but-discredited
historical conception of punitive damages as a supplement to individual compensatory damages”);
Crump, supra note 60, at 182 (“In any event, the compensation rationale for punitive damages is
dubious.”). But see Sebok, supra note 6, at 163; Owen, supra note 6, at 373-74 (including
compensation as one of the functions of punitive damages); Ellis, supra note 10, at 3.
82. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1521. Some courts, after BMW, had speculated about whether
the Court had included “intentional malice” as a permissible reprehensibility factor. See, e.g.,
Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 345 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(finding helpful the Court’s clarification in State Farm because “we did not originally consider
intentional malice as a criterion of reprehensibility specifically mentioned in [BMW]”).
83. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1521.
84. Id.
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reprehensibility in State Farm’s conduct sufficient to warrant some
punitive liability, even though it did not explicitly identify the
reprehensibility factors on which it based this conclusion.85
The Court in State Farm also expanded on the federalism concerns
it addressed in BMW, holding that Utah had impermissibly infringed
upon the sovereignty of its sister states by punishing State Farm for
conduct that occurred in other states. Whether other states would regard
such conduct as lawful or unlawful, the Court ruled that no state has a
legitimate interest in punishing conduct that occurs outside its borders.86
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy emphasized the basic tenet of
federalism “that each State may make its own reasoned judgment about
what conduct is permitted or proscribed within it borders, and each State
alone can determine what measure of punishment, if any, to impose on a
defendant who acts within its jurisdiction.”87 In order to legitimately
adjudicate State Farm’s conduct toward other people in other states,
Justice Kennedy explained, those people would have to be included as
parties and Utah courts would be required to apply the laws of the
applicable states to their claims.88
Justice Kennedy acknowledged, however, that the Court’s prior
cases had established that a plaintiff could introduce out-of-state conduct
to demonstrate the relative reprehensibility of a defendant’s in-state
conduct. First, such conduct may reveal the “deliberateness and
culpability” of a defendant’s actions.89 Second, prior misconduct by a
defendant (even in another state) may be relevant because “a recidivist
may be punished more severely than a first offender.”90
In State Farm, however, the Court held that neither of these
justifications applied because the evidence of State Farm’s other alleged
misconduct failed to bear a sufficient relationship to the specific harm
inflicted on the Campbells.91 This evidence included State Farm’s
85. Id. Clearly the Court found that State Farm acted with at least deceit, if not malice and
trickery. And the Campbells were certainly financially vulnerable, although the opinion does not
mention this factor.
86. Id. at 1522 (“Nor, as a general rule, does a State have a legitimate concern in imposing
punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of the State’s
jurisdiction.”); see also Margaret Meriwether Cordray, The Limits of State Sovereignty and the Issue
of Multiple Punitive Damages Awards, 78 OR. L. REV. 275, 305-09 (1999) (urging post-BMW that
state sovereignty principles should preclude unlawful as well as lawful out-of-state conduct).
87. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1523.
88. Id. at 1522 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1523.
91. Id. (stating that State Farm’s other misconduct “had nothing to do with a third-party
lawsuit [such as the Campbells’]”).
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handling of other claims in other states and, even more off the mark, its
employment practices.92 For a “prior transgression” to be relevant as an
aggravating factor in the reprehensibility analysis, the Court pointed out,
the transgression must be “similar” to the conduct being punished.93
Here, the Court found that the evidence of State Farm’s other
misconduct had no bearing on its dealings with the Campbells.
More fundamentally, the Court held that the punitive damages
award upheld by the Utah Supreme Court violated due process because
it punished State Farm for conduct “independent from the acts upon
which liability was premised.”94 Any assessment of reprehensibility
must be limited to the conduct that caused harm to the plaintiff.
According to State Farm, due process does not permit a court to
“adjudicate the merits of other parties’ hypothetical claims against the
defendant under the guise of the reprehensibility analysis.”95 State Farm
thus walks a very fine line indeed, allowing courts to consider—but not
punish—out-of-state conduct and harm to people other than the plaintiff
and, even then, only when such evidence is sufficiently “similar” to the
specific conduct that harmed the plaintiff.96
With respect to BMW’s second excessiveness guidepost, the Court
reiterated its reluctance to set “a bright-line ratio” of punitive damages to
plaintiff harm which a punitive damages award cannot exceed.97 But
despite this reluctance, State Farm sets forth a highly detailed ratio
analysis for lower courts assessing the excessiveness of a punitive
damages award, including extensive discussion of the factors that will
justify ratios of 1:1, 4:1, or (in rare cases) awards in excess of 9:1.
Citing Haslip and BMW, the Court explained that most cases will
warrant no more than a 4:1 ratio.98 This 4:1 benchmark in part derives
92. Id. Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, took issue with the Court’s characterization of this outof-state conduct as irrelevant. She argued that the Campbells’ experience with State Farm indeed
“exemplifies and reflects an overarching underpayment scheme.” Id. at 1530 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
93. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1523.
94. Id.
95. Id. (noting that the Utah Supreme Court’s overly broad punitive mission can be summed
up in its acknowledgment that “[t]he harm is minor to the individual but massive in the aggregate”).
96. Cf. Cordray, supra note 86, at 313 (warning of the “significant risk that once the jury is
presented with evidence of the defendant’s similar misconduct in other states, the jury will succumb
to the temptation to punish the defendant directly for that conduct as well, rather than simply using
the evidence to determine reprehensibility”).
97. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524; see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582
(1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993).
98. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524 (noting that punitive damages awards “more than four
times the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional
impropriety”); see also BMW, 517 U.S. at 581; Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24.
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from a long legislative history of imposing “double, treble or quadruple
damages to deter and punish.”99 While the Court acknowledged that
states are not necessarily bound by these ratios, it nevertheless urged
courts to recognize the “obvious” point that such ratios “are more likely
to comport with due process” than higher ratios, such as 500:1 (the ratio
in BMW) or 145:1 (as in State Farm).100
The Court also asserted that its punitive damages “jurisprudence
and the principles it has now established” indicate that due process
rarely will be satisfied by a ratio in excess of 9:1.101 Three factors set
forth in BMW, according to State Farm, will justify a double digit ratio:
“where ‘a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount
of economic damages’”; “where ‘the injury is hard to detect’”; or where
“‘the monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to
determine.’”102 None of these factors, according to the Court, were
present in State Farm.
Indeed, the Court for the first time warned that the converse
situation, where “compensatory damages are substantial,” may dictate a
punitive damages award no greater than the plaintiff’s compensatory
damages, in effect a 1:1 ratio.103 While the Court offered no guidance on
the amount of compensatory damages it will regard as “substantial,”104 it
had no trouble finding the Campbells’ $1 million compensatory damages
award to be “substantial” enough to trigger this 1:1 ratio limitation.105
Unlike the 4:1 and 9:1 analyses, which the Court asserted its prior cases
had already demonstrated, State Farm’s 1:1 ratio based on “substantial”
compensatory damages clearly reflects new territory.
In yet another new and provocative development, the Court noted
that the “substantial” compensatory award here already contained a
“punitive element” because it was based primarily on the emotional
distress suffered by the Campbells.106 Because such emotional distress
99. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1524 (“[F]ew awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”). In her dissenting
opinion, Justice Ginsburg harshly criticized the Court’s characterization of its prior punitive
damages cases as “established” law, pointing out that the first case invalidating a punitive damages
award on due process grounds occurred as recently as 1996: “If our activity in this domain is now
‘well-established,’ it takes place on ground not long held.” Id. at 1527 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 1524 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 582).
103. Id.
104. See infra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
105. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526 (concluding that a punitive damages award “at or near” $1
million would be warranted).
106. Id. at 1525.
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damages already seek to “condemn” a defendant for the “outrage and
humiliation” suffered by plaintiffs, the Court suggested that punitive
damages might be unnecessarily “duplicat[ive].”107 This analysis is
consistent with the argument for de novo review made in Cooper that at
an earlier time punitive damage awards operated to provide
compensation for elements of damages for which recovery was not
permitted under traditional rules restricting actual damages.108 It
remains to be seen how serious the Court is about this particular
limitation on punitive damages, but its potential implications for tort
cases involving emotional distress could be quite significant.
State Farm also rejected each of the Utah Supreme Court’s
proffered justifications for its triple digit ratio. First, State Farm’s
misconduct in other states could only properly be considered in the
reprehensibility analysis—and the Court reiterated its conclusion that the
out-of-state conduct here had no relevance because of its insufficient
nexus to the plaintiffs’ harm.109 With respect to the Utah Supreme
Court’s second justification, the Court found insufficient evidence in the
record to support the assertion that a high ratio was warranted because
State Farm’s conduct affected other Utah citizens. Third, the Court
emphasized that because a state must justify its punitive damages awards
only with regard to the conduct that specifically harmed the plaintiff, a
high punitive damages award could not be justified on the basis that a
defendant will otherwise “be punished in only the rare case.”110
Finally, the Court disapproved of Utah’s reliance on the relative
wealth of State Farm in justifying its high ratio: “The wealth of a
defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages
award.”111 This statement appears to be somewhat at odds with the
Court’s approval in TXO of a state punitive damages procedure that
expressly included the wealth of the defendant as a permissible factor for
the jury to consider.112 As in its treatment of out-of-state conduct and
107. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. c (1977)).
108. See Sebok, supra note 6.
109. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1525.
110. Id. But see Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its
Alternatives, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2185, 2211-15 (1999) (urging that “the rate at which the probability
of punishment declines is a key factor” in determining the proper amount of punitive damages).
111. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1525.
112. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 n.28 (1993) (“Under wellsettled law, however, factors such as these [including net worth of the defendant] are typically
considered in assessing punitive damages.”); see also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S.
1, 21-22 (1991) (permitting an appellate court to consider the defendant’s “financial position”). Yet
the Court in TXO acknowledged that the enormous wealth of the defendant “increased the risk that
the award may have been influenced by prejudice against large corporations, a risk that is of special
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harm to others, the Court here declined to declare such evidence
inadmissible, but nevertheless imposed strict limitations on its relevance
that will likely prove difficult for juries and courts to apply.
With respect to the third prong of the BMW excessiveness test, the
Court pointedly observed that it “need not dwell long on this guidepost”
because the relevant Utah statute would only have sanctioned State Farm
with a $10,000 fine, “an amount dwarfed by the $145 million punitive
damages award.”113 The Court’s brief treatment of this third guidepost,
however, included a warning to courts regarding comparisons to
criminal sanctions, which its prior jurisprudence had explicitly
authorized. The Court acknowledged that its opinions in both BMW and
Haslip had permitted courts to consider relevant criminal penalties to
demonstrate “the seriousness with which a State views the wrongful
actions.”114 But the Court cautioned that criminal sanctions have little
utility in determining the propriety of a particular amount of punitive
damages: “Punitive damages are not a substitute for the criminal
process, and the remote possibility of a criminal sanction does not
automatically sustain a punitive damages award.”115
Justice Ginsburg dissented in State Farm, as she did in BMW, on
the basis that the Court’s invalidation of the Utah Supreme Court’s
award represents an impermissible intrusion into the states’ domain.116
Justice Ginsburg specifically took issue with the Court’s ratio
instructions, which she regarded as imposing “numerical controls” that
violate fundamental principles of federalism.117
Indeed, Justice
Ginsburg characterized the Court’s decision in State Farm as
representing a dangerously “swift conversion” of the flexible BMW
guideposts to “instructions that begin to resemble marching orders.”118
concern when the defendant is a nonresident.” Id. at 464. And Justice O’Connor partly based her
dissenting opinion in TXO on her concerns about the possible prejudice this factor played in the
jury’s high award. Id. at 493 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
113. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526. The Court also rejected Utah’s reliance on “the loss of
State Farm’s business license, the disgorgement of profits, and possible imprisonment” because
such sanctions were impermissibly based on irrelevant out-of-state conduct. Id.
114. Id. at 1526 (citing BMW, 517 U.S. at 575; Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23).
115. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526 (“Great care must be taken to avoid use of the civil process
to assess criminal penalties that can be imposed only after the heightened protections of a criminal
trial have been observed, including, of course, its higher standards of proof.”).
116. Id. at 1527 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also supra note 101 and accompanying text.
117. Id. at 1531.
118. Id. Justices Scalia and Thomas also dissented from the Court’s opinion in State Farm, in
brief opinions reiterating their view that “excessive” punitive damages awards are not precluded by
the Due Process Clause. Id. at 1526 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia also reiterated his belief that the BMW guidepost analysis “is insusceptible of principled
application.” Id.
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III. POST-STATE FARM: CONTINUING AMBIGUITIES AND UNRESOLVED
QUESTIONS
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in State Farm suggests a puzzlement
bordering on incredulity that the Utah Supreme Court could have been
so misguided in its application of the BMW guideposts,119 a tone also
present in Justice Stevens’ discussion of the BMW guideposts in
Cooper.120 One suspects that the present majority of the Court in
support of a substantive due process right to challenge the imposition of
punitive damages awards has been disappointed by the failure of some
lower courts to comprehend or adhere to its guidance, prompting a
decision in State Farm that stakes out bolder and more detailed
boundaries on permissible levels of punitive damages.
Yet it is clear from the questions left unanswered (and, in some
cases, created) by State Farm that the Court inevitably will be forced to
return to its task of elucidating those boundaries. This Part will briefly
examine some of those open issues and the immediate aftermath of State
Farm on lower courts.
A. Interpreting State Farm’s Reprehensibility Instructions
The Court in BMW and State Farm considered reprehensibility a
vital factor in the due process excessiveness analysis, both in justifying
any punitive damages at all and in calculating the acceptable size of an
award, if one is imposed.121 BMW suggested that reprehensibility, which
the Court defined as referring to the “enormity” of the defendant’s
offense, may be the most important of the three guideposts.122 The
Court expanded on this theme in State Farm by enumerating five
specific factors that courts may utilize in evaluating the degree of
culpability a defendant’s conduct may demonstrate.123 While the
Court’s list may not exhaust the possibilities of flagrant conduct
warranting punitive damages,124 it is certainly unlikely that the absence
119. See id. at 1521 (referring to the proper application of BMW’s guideposts on the facts of
State Farm as representing “neither [a] close nor difficult” case).
120. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 441 (2001)
(referring to a “series of questionable conclusions” in the district court’s application of BMW that
the Ninth Circuit would do well to reconsider during its de novo review on remand).
121. But see Crump, supra note 60, at 233 (arguing that an approach “concentrating principally
on blameworthiness confounds the accuracy of the process because of the greater difficulty of fixing
and evaluating this philosophical abstraction”).
122. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
123. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1521 (2003).
124. See, e.g., Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1043 (9th Cir. 2003)
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of all of the enumerated factors would yield a defensible decision to
award punitive damages. Beyond its suggestion, however, that a
defendant’s conduct may not be sufficiently reprehensible to warrant any
punitive liability if only one of these factors is present,125 State Farm
offers little guidance as to the relative weight of these reprehensibility
factors or how they may interact with each other to enhance the
reasonableness of a particular punitive damages award.
Moreover, the Court’s handling of the reprehensibility analysis in
both BMW and State Farm suggests the possibility that the Court did not
think the facts of either case warranted any award of punitive damages at
all, but was unwilling to so rule, preferring to focus primary attention on
the unjustifiable sizes of the awards. The Court’s reprehensibility
discussion appears more suited to a threshold determination of whether
to impose punitive damages rather than providing any insight into how
the relative degree of reprehensibility can inform the size of a particular
award. Again, while the facts of State Farm struck the Court as
reflecting conduct more reprehensible than that in BMW, neither case
involved the kind of reprehensible conduct that might justify a high
award even exceeding its proposed ratio scale.
Thus, it is hardly surprising that lower courts have continued to
flounder somewhat in their attempts to apply the Court’s imprecise
instructions about the role reprehensibility plays in justifying and
determining the proper size of punitive damage awards.126 An open
question of particular importance is the role of a reprehensibility factor
so far absent from the Court’s cases: the defendant’s intentional
disregard for the health and safety of others. Of the courts considering
State Farm’s impact in such cases, some have taken the position that this
factor justifies an award higher than 4:1, particularly if coupled with
other factors, such as intentional malice, trickery or deceit.127 This
(explaining that the “fraudulent business practices” in BMW and State Farm are significantly
“different in kind from the reprehensibility of intentional discrimination on the basis of race or
ethnicity”).
125. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Asa-Brandt, Inc. v. ADM Inv. Serv., Inc., 344 F.3d 738, 747 (8th Cir. 2003)
(explaining that “according to the hierarchy of reprehensiveness, [defendant’s breach of fiduciary
duty] was clearly more reprehensibile than the conduct in [BMW], and is at a similar level to the
conduct in State Farm”); DiSorbo v. Hoy, 343 F.3d 172, 187 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding a punitive
damages award excessive despite presence of each of BMW’s “aggravating factors”); Eden Elec.,
Ltd. v. Amana Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 958, 974 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (reading State Farm to preclude a
punitive damages award more than ten times compensatory damages “even where all the
reprehensibile considerations are present”).
127. See Bocci v. Key Pharm., Inc., 76 P.3d 669, 675 (Or. Ct. App. 2003). The Oregon Court
of Appeals, however, declined to apply a ratio in excess of 4:1 in a case involving serious personal
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confusion among lower courts is bound to persist until the Court
articulates more clearly the relative significance of the reprehensibility
factor in determining the amount of a punitive damages award, most
likely in a case reflecting such highly reprehensible conduct that there is
no question about punitive liability. Ultimately, the Court may have to
articulate claim-specific categories of reprehensibility to help lower
courts assess the relative reprehensibility in cases involving employment
discrimination, product liability, environmental harms, or fraud cases.
Further refinement of the reprehensibility factor may prove particularly
critical if State Farm’s ratio instructions result in punitive damage
awards that under-deter defendant misconduct by adhering too strictly to
the Court’s 4:1 benchmark or applying its 1:1 ratio too aggressively.
B. Implementing State Farm’s Ratio Guidelines
One of the loudest messages to emerge from State Farm is the
Court’s instruction regarding the constitutionally required relationship
between the amount of a punitive damages award and the degree of harm
caused by the defendant’s conduct.128 While the Court in State Farm
purported only to be clarifying limitations its prior cases had already
established, its proportionality analysis for the first time established a
4:1 benchmark ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, as
well as factors that will justify upward or downward departures from
that ratio. State and federal courts alike have responded to State Farm’s
ratio instructions, striking down129 a host of punitive damages awards on
injury from a defective fishbowl because of the absence of other aggravating factors and “the
Supreme Court’s focus on ratios in the usual case.” Waddill v. Anchor Hocking, Inc., 78 P.3d 570,
576 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (remitting a punitive damages award from $1 million to $403,000 postState Farm, reducing the ratio from 10:1 to 4:1).
128. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text. Applying State Farm’s ratio analysis,
one district court explained that “whatever vagueness and tensions State Farm seems to reflect, to
this [c]ourt the ruling’s higher frequencies are quite audible.” TVT Records v. Island Def Jam
Music Group, 279 F. Supp. 2d 413, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (remitting multi-million punitive damages
awards it found constitutionally excessive in light of high punitive to compensatory damages ratio).
129. Courts have grappled with the proper disposition of an excessive punitive damages award,
variously granting a remittitur (permitting the plaintiff to accept the court’s assessment of an
acceptable punitive damages award or face a new trial), reducing such awards to the “constitutional
maximum” or, in the case of appellate courts, remanding the award to the trial court for a new trial.
Compare Bocci v. Key Pharm., Inc., 76 P.3d 669 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (ordering remittitur of
excessive punitive damages award) and BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 646 So.2d 619, 629 (Ala. 1994)
(same), with Johansen v. Combustion Eng., Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999) (“The court
orders a remittitur when it believes the jury’s award is unreasonable on the facts. A constitutional
reduction, on the other hand, is a determination that the law does not permit the award [and the
court therefore] has a mandatory duty to correct an unconstitutionally excessive verdict . . . .”) and
Roth v. Farner-Bocken Co., 667 N.W.2d 651, 671 (S.D. 2003) (remanding for new trial).
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the basis that the ratios at issue reflected an unconstitutionally
disproportionate amount of punitive damages.130
But to the extent Justice Ginsburg predicted that State Farm’s ratio
analysis would amount to “marching orders” to state courts,131 those
orders certainly have not been uniformly received by lower courts. State
Farm’s warnings about excessive punitive damages ratios may well have
been loud, but they are far from clear.132 This lack of clarity, to some
degree, is simply a function of the Court’s appropriate refusal to
announce a per se ratio that would calculate the constitutionally precise
amount of punitive damages in every case.133 No such bright-line test
could possibly be imposed, of course, because each case requires
individualized assessment of both the wrongful conduct and the harm it
caused.134 As Judge Posner has explained: “The judicial function is to
police a range, not a point.”135 But courts continue to struggle even with
the assessment of a proper constitutional range of punitive damages in
the wake of State Farm.
1. Identifying the State Farm “Benchmark”
State Farm’s ratio instructions appear to reflect a set of punitive
damages guidelines reminiscent of sentencing guidelines in criminal
cases. The Court reiterated its approval of a 4:1 ratio between punitive

130. See, e.g., TVT Records, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 413; Waits v. City of Chicago, No. 01 C 4010,
2003 WL 21310277 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 2003); McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d
1225, 1237 (N.D. Ala. 2003); Eden Elec., Ltd. v. Amana Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 958, 974-75 (N.D.
Iowa 2003); Roth, 667 N.W.2d at 671; Bocci, 76 P.3d 669; Henley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 5 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 42 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); Diamond Woodworks, Inc. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d
736 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
131. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Parrish v. Sollecito, 280 F. Supp. 2d 145, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (describing State
Farm as “signal[ing] unequivocally that the Due Process Clause serves to constrain jury and court
discretion,” but providing far “less clear” guidance to courts regarding “the assessment of how
much is too much”).
133. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1524 (2003) (quoting BMW,
517 U.S. at 582) (“[W]e have consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked
by a simple mathematical formula, even one that compares actual and potential damages to the
punitive award.”); see also Williams v. Kaufman County, 343 F.3d 689, 711 n.77 (5th Cir. 2003)
(noting the “necessarily unscientific balancing of the factors laid out in [BMW]” as a significant
factor in finding the amount of punitive damages awarded to be reasonable).
134. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524 (“The precise award in any case, of course, must be based
upon the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s conduct and the harm to the plaintiff.”); cf.
Crump, supra note 60, at 212 (suggesting that ratio analysis can be defended on the ground that
“actual damages provide a measure – albeit an exceedingly rough measure – of the actor’s moral
blameworthiness”).
135. Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003).
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and compensatory damages,136 and then acknowledged specific factors
that would warrant upward or lower departures from that benchmark.137
The Court suggested that ratios exceeding 9:1 will rarely comport with
due process,138 while a ratio as low as 1:1 may “perhaps” be the
“outermost limit” in cases involving “substantial” compensatory
damages.139 Although State Farm’s sliding scale ratio analysis will
likely constrain some of the most disproportionate punitive damages
awards, they also introduce several new interpretive challenges for lower
courts to address.
The Court’s cautionary language about ratios exceeding 9:1 seems
to have resonated most pervasively among lower courts.140 Several
courts have recognized that double-digit ratios raise a “red flag,”141
while others have called such awards “suspect” under State Farm.142
Indeed, the vast majority of decisions reversing awards of punitive
damages have involved double or triple digit ratios of punitive to
compensatory damages.143
Some courts seem to have interpreted State Farm’s statements
136. See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524 (referencing double, treble and quadruple ratios, and
its prior endorsements of a 4:1 ratio); see also BMW, 517 U.S. at 581; Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24.
137. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
138. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524. The Court identified three justifications for “ratios greater
than those we have previously upheld.” Id. This reference to the Court’s prior ratios is not
particularly illuminating, however, because it held that a 4:1 ratio in Haslip was “close to the line of
constitutional impropriety,” 499 U.S. at 23-24, while in TXO it approved a ratio of over 500:1 (or
10:1 pursuant to the Court’s “potential harm” analysis).
139. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524.
140. See, e.g., Eden Elec., Ltd. v. Amana Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 958, 973 (N.D. Iowa 2003)
(“accept[ing]” that post-BMW and State Farm, a punitive damages award “probably cannot exceed a
10:1 ratio”); Henley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 42, 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (“As we read
[State Farm], a double-digit ratio will be justified rarely, and perhaps never in a case where the
plaintiff has recovered an ample award of compensatory damages.”).
141. McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1231 (N.D. Ala. 2003); see also
Jones v. Sheahan, No. 99 C 3669, 01 C 1844, 2003 WL 22508171, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2003)
(double-digit ratios “raise[] a cautionary flag”).
142. Werremeyer v. K.C. Auto Salvage Co., Inc., No. WD 61179, 2003 WL 21487311 (Mo.
Ct. App. Jun. 30, 2003).
143. See, e.g., Waddill v. Anchor Hocking, Inc., 78 P.3d 570, 576 (Or. Ct. App. 2003)
(remitting 10:1 ratio to 4:1); Daka, Inc. v. McCrae, 839 A.2d 682 (D.C. 2003) (remitting 26:1 ratio
to 5:1); Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (remitting 58:1 ratio to
5:1); Waits, 2003 WL 21310277 (remitting 100:1 and 33:1 ratios to an average ratio of 1.5:1);
McClain, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1237 (reducing 20:1 ratio to 9:1 ratio); Roth, 667 N.W.2d at 671
(reversing punitive damages award reflecting a 20:1 ratio); Henley, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 42 (remitting
17:1 ratio to 6:1); Diamond Woodworks, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 761-62 (remitting 13:1 ratio to 3.8:1);
Bocci v. Key Pharm., Inc., 76 P.3d 669 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (remitting 45:1 ratio to 7:1). But see,
e.g., TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music Group, 279 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (remitting
as excessive punitive damages awards reflecting a 6:1 ratio to achieve a 1:1 ratio); Eden Elec, 258
F. Supp. 2d at 974-75 (reducing 8:1 ratio to 4:1).
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evincing particular concern about ratios higher than single digits as
tantamount to the Court’s approval of any award 9:1 or less.144 The
Ninth Circuit, for example, in Zhang v. American Gem Seafoods, Inc.,
defended the constitutionality of a 7:1 ratio by declaring that “[w]e are
aware of no Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit case disapproving of a
single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, and we
decline to extend the law in this case.”145 State Farm clearly does not
support such an interpretation, as evidenced by its detailed articulation
of the factors warranting ratios higher than double digits and those that
suggest a 1:1 ratio ceiling.146 Due process cannot be satisfied by resort
to such a sledgehammer approach, amounting to the virtual immunity
from constitutional scrutiny of any award under a 10:1 ratio. While
confusing and imprecise, State Farm’s proportionality instructions
require a far more nuanced and fact-specific inquiry into the
constitutionality of any award.
2. Factors Justifying Upward Departures from the State Farm
Benchmark
While only a few courts have actually imposed punitive damages
reflecting a 4:1 ratio post-State Farm,147 most have acknowledged the
need to identify circumstances that justify an upward departure from the
4:1 ratio.148 One lower court summed up State Farm as holding that “in
the usual case, i.e., a case in which the compensatory damages are
neither exceptionally high nor low, and in which the defendant’s conduct
is neither exceptionally extreme nor trivial, the outer constitutional limit
on the amount of punitive damages is approximately four times the
144. McClain, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1231 (finding that 6:1 ratio “easily meets [State Farm’s] new
ratio test,” and may “presumptively pass[] muster under the Due Process Clause”); Haggar Clothing
Co. v. Hernandez, No. 13-01-009-CV, 2003 WL 21982181 (Tex. App. Aug. 21, 2003) (approving
6.6:1 ratio in retaliatory discharge case as “within constitutional limits” apparently because the ratio
did not exceed double-digits); Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Tower Ins. Co., 661 N.W.2d
789, 803 (Wis. 2003) (approving punitive damages ratio of 7:1 without any explanation of why the
case warranted a ratio higher than 4:1); cf. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 1064, 1075 (Utah
2003) (referring to a 5:1 ratio as “well within the single digits discussed by the Supreme Court in
State Farm”).
145. Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1044 (9th Cir. 2003).
146. See, e.g., Bocci, 76 P.3d 669 (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that under State Farm any
award that has only a single-digit ratio will satisfy due process).
147. Jones v. Sheahan, Nos. 99 C 3669, 01 C 1844, 2003 WL 22508171 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4,
2003) (finding case warranted punitive damages ratio neither higher nor lower than 4:1); Parrish v.
Sollecito, 280 F. Supp. 2d 145, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (referencing and enforcing the 4:1 “baseline”
established by State Farm); Eden, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 974-75; Diamond, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762.
148. See, e.g., Bocci, 76 P.3d at 669.
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amount of compensatory damages.”149 Determining which cases are
“usual” and which involve “exceptional” circumstances, of course, has
not been an easy task.
Courts have cited each of the factors identified in State Farm150 in
justifying upward departures, authorizing ratios in excess of 4:1 (in some
cases as high as 100:1),151 where “the injury is hard to detect,”152 or
where “the monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been
difficult to determine,”153 or where a “particularly egregious act has
resulted in only a small amount of economic154 damages.”155
With respect to the last factor, courts interpreting the requirement
of a sufficiently “egregious act” have concluded that upward departures
were warranted by conduct that reflected a disregard for the health156 or
149. Diamond, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762; see also Waddill v. Anchor Hocking, 78 P.3d 570,
576 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (referring to the Court’s 4:1 ratio for the “usual” case).
150. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 582).
151. Id. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Case, 340 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 2003) (approving 100:1 ratio in case
involving housing discrimination where compensatory damages were only $500).
152. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524. See, e.g., Werremeyer v. K.C. Auto Salvage Co., Nos.
WD 61179, WD 61210, WD 61245, 2003 WL 21487311, at *10 (Mo. Ct. App. Jun. 30, 2003)
(justifying 13:1 ratio with reference to fact that “[t]he laws of chance would crack under the weight
of a claim that the average consumer could have detected the kind of fraud perpetrated in this
case”); see also Sunstein et al., supra note 2, at 2082 (justifying punitive damages where defendant
“has been able to conceal his identity”).
153. See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003); Jones
v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1277 (D. Kan. 2003); S. Union Co. v. Southwest Gas Corp.,
281 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1105 (D. Ariz. 2003) (explaining that defendant’s “unquantifiable breach of
the public trust” warranted $60 million punitive damages award); Phelps v. Louisville Water Co.,
103 S.W.3d 46 (Ky. 2003).
154. The Court’s imprecise reference to “economic” rather than “compensatory” damages,
State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1521-25, has not been interpreted as a limiting factor, as courts have
invoked this upward departure rationale in a number of cases involving damages based on physical
or personal (as opposed to “purely economic”) harm. See, e.g., Mathias, 347 F.3d at 672; Phelps,
103 S.W.3d at 46; Bocci v. Key Pharm., Inc., 76 P.3d 669 (Or. Ct. App. 2003); Henley v. Philip
Morris Inc., 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 42 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); cf. Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d
1020, 1044 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that intentional discrimination on the basis of race or
ethnicity reflects a very “different kind of harm, a serious affront to personal liberty”).
155. See, e.g., Mathias, 347 F.3d at 672; Williams v. Kaufman County, 343 F.3d 689, 711 n.75
(5th Cir. 2003) (upholding 150:1 ratio in civil rights case, finding State Farm’s ratio guidance to be
“inapposite” in a case involving $100 in nominal damages); Lincoln v. Case, 340 F.3d 283 (5th Cir.
2003); Jones, 2003 WL 22132723; Parrish v. Sollecito, 280 F. Supp. 2d 145, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Phelps, 103 S.W.3d at 46; Bocci v. Key Pharm., Inc., 76 P.3d 669 (Or. Ct. App. 2003); Henley v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 42 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); see also Sunstein et al., supra note 2, at
2083.
156. See, e.g., Mathias, 347 F.3d at 672 (approving a 37:1 ratio because defendant exposed
plaintiffs to a known bedbug infestation); Phelps, 103 S.W.3d at 46 (approving 11:1 ratio in case
where teenagers were killed by defendant’s negligence); Bocci, 76 P.3d at 669 (reducing punitive
damages award ratio from 45:1 to 7:1 ratio due to defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentations
regarding the safety of a prescription drug); Henley, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 42 (reducing a punitive
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dignitary interests157 of others, or misconduct by a state official.158 Most
courts have interpreted “small,” however, to be a relative rather than an
absolute term. Compensatory damages ranging from $150,000 to
$500,000 have been deemed sufficiently “small” to warrant the
imposition of a ratio in excess of 4:1 (although less than 9:1).159 Indeed,
the district court in the Exxon Valdez case recently characterized
compensatory damages of over $500,000,000 as small enough to warrant
a high ratio, remitting its previously reversed punitive damages award of
$5 billion to $4.5 billion.160 Given this range of compensatory damages
awards that few would consider “small” as an objective matter, further
guidance, obviously short of an absolute number, is needed to help lower
courts more uniformly and fairly determine when a higher ratio should
be imposed based on this rationale.
“Potential” harm represents another factor acknowledged by the
Court as justifying an otherwise high ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages.161 In State Farm, the Court reiterated its prior holdings that a
punitive damages award (the denominator162 in the ratio equation)
should be compared to a nominator reflecting not only the harm
reflected in a plaintiff’s actual damages, but also the amount of
“potential” harm that might have been caused by a defendant’s
conduct.163 Determining both the likelihood164 and the amount of such
damages award that reflected a 17:1 ratio to 6:1, justifying its upward departure from 4:1 because of
defendant’s “extraordinarily reprehensible” conduct in tortiously manufacturing and marketing
cigarettes).
157. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Case, 340 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 2003) (housing discrimination); Jones,
281 F. Supp. 2d at 1277 (sexual harassment claim).
158. See, e.g., S. Union Co. v. Southwest Gas Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Ariz. 2003)
(illegal interference and cover-up by state corporation commissioner). But see Jones v. Sheahan,
Nos. 99 C 3669, 01 C 1844, 2003 WL 22508171, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2003) (rejecting
plaintiff’s argument that sheriff’s failure to adequately protect inmates from harm was sufficiently
reprehensible to warrant the double-digit punitive damages ratios of 20:1 and 10:1).
159. See, e.g., Phelps, 103 S.W.3d at 46 ($150,000 in compensatory damages justified 11:1
ratio resulting in a $2 million punitive damages award); Bocci, 76 P.3d at 669 ($500,000 in
compensatory damages justified 6:1 ratio because of outrageousness of defendant’s conduct). But
see Mathias, 347 F.3d at 672 ($5,000 in compensatory damages).
160. In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. Alaska 2004). The court explained that
while the aggregate compensatory damages were high, the per plaintiff compensatory damages
amounted only to $15,000.
161. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524-25; see also supra note 31 and accompanying text.
162. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1243 (9th Cir. 2001).
163. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524-25; see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,
582 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993) (first
acknowledging the concept of relevant “potential” harm).
164. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 442 (2001)
(distinguishing between harm “likely” to occur and harm that might occur); Roth v. Farner-Bocken
Co., 667 N.W.2d 651, 669 (S.D. 2003) (finding “unlikelihood of serious potential harm”).
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potential harm, however, are both “ordinarily arguable” and “somewhat
indeterminate” endeavors,165 which the Court failed squarely to address
in either State Farm or BMW.166 Its discussion of this factor in Cooper,
however, puts lower courts on notice that a remote likelihood of such
potential harm will not suffice to justify a high ratio.167
Despite this lack of guidance, lower courts have read the Court’s
State Farm opinion as adhering to its previous dictates regarding the
relevance of potential harm, and have permitted punitive damages
awards in amounts they would have deemed excessive absent this
factor.168 In order to take potential harm into account in justifying a
larger than ordinary award, at the very least, courts should require a
showing that the fact-finder relied on such theoretical impact in setting
the award; a potential harm analysis should not be introduced post hoc to
justify an otherwise excessive award.169
3. Factors Justifying Downward Departures from the State Farm
Benchmark
While lower courts have readily applied State Farm’s grounds for
permitting upward departures from the 4:1 ratio benchmark, only a few
have even recognized State Farm’s guidance regarding downward
departures.170 The Court in State Farm suggested that the amount of
punitive damages might be limited to reflect a ratio “perhaps only equal
165. Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1243.
166. See, e.g., S. Union Co. v. Southwest Gas Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1104 (D. Ariz.
2003) (noting that while “[t]he use of potential harm in assessing the ratio continues throughout the
Court’s most recent decisions,” neither BMW nor State Farm “involved an issue of potential harm”).
167. Cooper, 532 U.S. 424 .
168. See, e.g., Asa-Brandt, Inc. v. ADM Inv. Serv., Inc., 344 F.3d 738, 747 (8th Cir. 2003)
(upholding $1.25 million punitive damages award as constitutionally reasonable because plaintiffs
would have suffered multi-million dollars in damages “if [the defendant’s] scheme had worked”); S.
Union Co., 281 F. Supp. 2d at 1104 (even though plaintiff did not recover compensatory damages
for “speculative lost profits, the potential for such damage could be factored into the jury’s decision
to punish [the defendant]”); Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Tower Ins. Co., 661 N.W.2d
789, 803 (Wis. 2003) (determining that the ratio of punitive damages to harm reflected an
acceptable 7:1 ratio when potential harm to plaintiff was considered); Simon v. San Paolo U.S.
Holding Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 367, 391 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
169. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 483-87 (1993) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
170. See, e.g., TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music Group, 279 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 274 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Roth v. FarnerBocken Co., 667 N.W.2d 651, 671 (S.D. 2003). A California appeals court invoked State Farm’s
“substantial” compensatory damages language, but interpreted it as instructing that “where a
plaintiff has been fully compensated with a substantial compensatory damages award, any ratio over
4 to 1 is ‘close to the line.’” Henley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 42, 85 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003).
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to compensatory damages” when a plaintiff has been awarded
“substantial” compensatory damages.171 Indeed, in State Farm itself, the
Court urged the Utah court on remand to consider a 1:1 ratio appropriate
in light of the Campbells’ “substantial” $1 million in compensatory
damages.172
State Farm’s downward departure reasoning reflects the Court’s
imposition of a new due process limitation on the imposition of punitive
damages awards,173 and its significance has yet to be fully explored.
Again, as in determining the concept of “small” damages warranting
upward departures, the Court in State Farm provided scant guidance
regarding the relative or absolute amount of damages courts should
regard as “substantial” enough to justify only a 1:1 ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages. Some lower courts that have
expressly addressed this factor have found that compensatory damages
of $25,000174 and $125,000175 were “substantial” enough to warrant a
downward departure to a 1:1 ratio.176 But most courts have failed
entirely to acknowledge this possible limitation on punitive damages
awards, awarding compensatory damages ranging from $360,000177 to
$15 million178 without any consideration of whether such compensatory
awards were sufficiently “substantial” to justify a smaller amount of

171. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524; cf. Crump, supra note 60, at 224 (pointing out that a rigid
ratio analysis will overcompensate “where the conduct is discoverable and results in high actual
damage awards”).
172. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526.
173. The Ninth Circuit recognized this basis for limiting a punitive damages award in a case
decided pre-State Farm. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1244 (9th Cir. 2001). In Exxon
Valdez, the Ninth Circuit remanded a $5 billion punitive damages award as unconstitutionally
excessive, in part, because defendant’s $3.4 billion “costs and settlements in this case are so large, a
lesser amount is necessary to deter future acts.” Id. Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit included
consideration of Exxon’s total “expenses,” which included, in addition to the compensatory
damages at issue, Exxon’s clean up costs, other settlements, the fine and restitution imposed, and its
casualty losses. Id.
174. Roth v. Farner-Bocken Co., 667 N.W.2d 651, 671 (S.D. 2003). But see Jones v. Sheahan,
Nos. 99 C 3669, 01 C 1844, 2003 WL 22508171, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2003) (declaring that the
compensatory damages award of $25,000 was not “substantial” enough to warrant only a 1:1 ratio).
175. See TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music Group, 279 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
176. See also Daka, Inc. v. McCrae, No. 00-CV-1270, 01-CV-227, 2003 WL 23018830 (D.C.
Dec. 24, 2003) ($187,000); Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 274 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
($2 million).
177. See Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1044 (9th Cir. 2003) (approving
7:1 ratio).
178. See Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 345 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (explaining that its “$50 million punitive award is barely above three times the compensatory
award of $15 million in this case, . . . not even reaching the 4:1 ratio mentioned by the Court as a
threshold where the punitive award may become suspect”).
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punitive damages.179 At the very least, State Farm demands that courts
consider the possibility of a downward departure when a case involves
“substantial” compensatory damages, and the inconsistency of lower
courts’ interpretations of what constitutes “substantial” suggests the need
for additional guidance from the Court.
C. Role of Defendant’s Relative Wealth
In conventional tort theory, besides serving a retributive purpose,
the imposition of a punitive damages award may also serve the public
policy function of deterring the specific defendant from repeating the
actionable wrong, and providing a disincentive to others to commit
similar wrongs. This deterrent objective ordinarily allows a court to take
into account the relative wealth of the defendant in fashioning a punitive
damages award to assure the desired preventive effect.180
Over Justice O’Connor’s impassioned dissent,181 the Supreme
Court approved in TXO a state court’s imposition of an enormous
punitive damages award where the defendant’s wealth was one of the
primary factors considered by the jury.182 In striking down Utah’s
imposition of punitive damages in State Farm, however, the Court
expressly rejected Utah’s attempt to justify the size of its award on the
basis of the substantial wealth of the defendant, saying such a rationale

179. See, e.g., DiSorbo v. Hoy, 343 F.3d 172, 187 (2d Cir. 2003) (remitting to $75,000 a
punitive damages award of $1.275 million in a police brutality case without consideration of
whether plaintiff’s $250,000 compensatory damages award was sufficiently “substantial” to
otherwise justify downward departure); S. Union Co. v. Southwest Gas Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1090
(D. Ariz. 2003) (approving a 153:1 ratio despite compensatory damages of $390,000); Eden Elec.,
Ltd. v. Amana Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 958, 974-75 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (reducing punitive damages
award from 8:1 to 4:1 ratio in case involving $2 million in compensatory damages); Advocat, Inc. v.
Sauer, 111 S.W.3d 346 (Ark. 2003) (approving $63 million punitive damages award where plaintiff
was awarded $5 million in compensatory damages, explaining that the resulting 14:1 ratio –
incorrectly described by the court as 4:1 – is not “breathtaking”); Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 122 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 139 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) ($5,000,000 compensatory damages award).
180. See, e.g., Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 1064, 1072 (Utah 2003) (ruling that a
defendant’s wealth can be “either an aggravating or a mitigating factor in determining the size of a
punitive damage award, since punitive damages should be tailored to what is necessary to deter the
particular defendant, as well as others similarly situated, from repeating the prohibited conduct”).
But see Sunstein et al., supra note 2, at 2085 (“On a conventional view about optimal deterrence,
however, wealth and income are irrelevant”: “[A] punitive damages award should encourage a
defendant to engage in optimal behavior, whatever its wealth.”).
181. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 472-73 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 27-31 and
accompanying text.
182. See id. at 461; see also Eden, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 975 (noting that in pre-BMW cases, the
Court permitted juries to “consider the defendant’s wealth in determining punitive damages,”
although “the wealth of the wrongdoer must not be unduly emphasized”).
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could not validate an “otherwise unconstitutional” award.183
This apparent inconsistency with the TXO decision may be
confusing to lower courts, but it highlights the Court’s seemingly narrow
focus on the punishment feature of punitive damages,184 almost to the
exclusion of the well-settled deterrence function of such awards.185
Logically, if two defendants commit the same reprehensible act, causing
the same actual harm, and subject to the same criminal or civil fine, a
higher punitive damages award would be justified to deter repeated
wrongdoing by the wealthier of the two defendants.186 An amount that
might be sufficient to deter a less wealthy defendant could very well be
written off as simply a cost of doing business by a much wealthier
corporation, undermining the achievement of the deterrence goals of
punitive damages. And it is certainly true that for the less wealthy of the
two, a punitive damages award calculated irrespective of wealth risks
overdeterrence or potentially bankrupting the defendant by an award that
might only sting the wealthier but devastates the less wealthy defendant.
It is uncertain whether or when the Court will provide more explicit
guidance on the propriety of taking the defendant’s wealth into account
for the purpose of achieving effective deterrence,187 but State Farm is
clearly not being read by lower courts as foreclosing consideration of
wealth as a factor in deciding on the appropriate size of a punitive
damages award believed to be otherwise within constitutional
parameters.188
183. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
184. The Ninth Circuit, considering the case remanded to it by the Supreme Court in Cooper,
noted that the “potential deterrent effect of a punitive damages award is not mentioned expressly in
the [BMW] criteria, although it has continued to be considered in post-[BMW] cases. Here, we
acknowledge that the evidence would support a finding that a substantial punitive award might be
necessary to have a sufficient economic effect on Cooper to create deterrence.” Leatherman Tool
Group v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 285 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Eden, 258 F. Supp. 2d
at 975 (concluding that due process required it to “throw into the balance and otherwise take into
account [the defendant’s] net worth” when evaluating the amount of a punitive damages award).
185. See, e.g., Sunstein et al., supra note 2, at 2082 (discussing “traditional view” of punitive
damages as serving deterrence goals).
186. See, e.g., Eden, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 974 (explaining that “an award that would effectively
punish and deter General Motors or Bill Gates would have to be many, many times greater than an
award which would adequately punish and deter, say, the local one-store druggist”). But see
Sunstein et al., supra note 2, at 2085 (“On a conventional view about optimal deterrence, however,
wealth and income are irrelevant.” “[A] punitive damages award should encourage a defendant to
engage in optimal behavior, whatever its wealth.”).
187. Cf. Sunstein et al., supra note 2, at 2085 (pointing out the “particularly important dispute”
regarding “whether, on economic grounds, the wealth or income of the defendant should matter”).
188. See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003)
(reasoning that State Farm did not preclude consideration of the wealth of a defendant to the extent
that factor “enables the defendant to mount an extremely aggressive defense against suits such as
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D. The Aggregate Punishment Problem
One of the most significant questions left open after BMW and State
Farm is the proper calculation of, and the constitutional limitations on,
punitive damages for harm that affects multiple people. Courts and
commentators for decades have agonized over the policy aspects of the
aggregate punishment problem: how to achieve deterrence and
punishment goals in a case involving defendant conduct that affected
large numbers of people.189 If one punishes too lightly, a defendant
alleged to have caused harm to many may well be undeterred from
continuing the misconduct. Yet if courts impose significant punitive
damages awards in every case brought by a plaintiff affected by the
misconduct, the aggregate punitive damages liability may far exceed
legitimate state interests in punishment and deterrence.190
Although BMW itself involved a fraud perpetrated against 14
people in Alabama, the Court was frustratingly opaque about how to
determine punitive damages in such cases. In a footnote, for example
the Court observed that whether one looked to the ratio of the punitive
damages award to Dr. Gore’s harm ($4,000) or to all the harms imposed
on the Alabama citizens affected by BMW’s misconduct ($56,000), the
punitive damages award must be seen as disproportionate.191 So the
Court evaded the question of which measure courts ought to use in
calculating punitive damages in such mass tort cases – should a court
assess the punitive damages award vis-à-vis the harm done to the
plaintiff alone or should it compare the award to the full scope of harm
inflicted on everyone affected by the misconduct?
Given the

this and by doing so to make litigating against it very costly, which in turn may make it difficult for
the plaintiffs to find a lawyer willing to handle their case”); Eden, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 974
(concluding that “if the punitive damages award is to have any punitive or deterrent effect – the
stated rationale of such damages – then it is apparent that [the defendant’s] wealth and financial
condition must be taken into consideration”); cf. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 1064 (Utah
2003)
189. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Punitive Damages Awards in Product Liability Litigation:
Strong Medicine or Poison Pill?, 39 VILL. L. REV. 415, 423-31 (1994); Dennis Neil Jones et al.,
Multiple Punitive Damages Awards for a Single Course of Wrongful Conduct: The Need for a
National Policy to Protect Due Process, 43 ALA. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1991); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A
Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 152 (1986); Richard
A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness,
Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 55 (1983); David G. Owen, Problems in
Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1982); Laura J. Hines, Obstacles to Determining Punitive Damages in Class Actions, 36 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 889, 892-98 (2001).
190. See, e.g., Seltzer, supra note 189, at 55.
191. BMW, 517 U.S. at 582 n.35.
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constitutional implications of excessive punishment, this question looms
large in mass tort cases. And not only must a court choose whether to
take into account harm done to persons other than the plaintiff, it must
also consider the implications of prior punitive damages awards based
on the same misconduct. If deterrence and punishment goals have been
met by prior awards, must a court deny any punitive damages in
subsequent cases?
State Farm offers some tantalizing hints about the Court’s views on
the question of aggregate punitive damages, but offers no clear guidance.
While the Court ultimately rejects (over Justice Ginsburg’s objections)
Utah’s characterization of State Farm’s conduct in its handling of other
claims as sufficiently “similar” to play any role at all in the proper
calculation of punitive damages in the Campbells’ case,192 it noted that
truly similar conduct would be “relevant” to the state’s determination of
reprehensibility.193 Yet the Court in State Farm articulated an arguably
individualistic approach to punitive damages, emphasizing that “a
defendant should be punished for the conduct that harmed the
plaintiff,”194 and criticizing the Utah courts for punishing State Farm for
harm that was “minor to the individual but massive in the aggregate.”195
The Court explained that “[d]ue process does not permit courts, in the
calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties’
hypothetical claims against a defendant,”196 and warned that such
punishment “creates the possibility of multiple punitive damages awards
for the same conduct.”197
As with the wealth of defendant and out-of-state conduct factors,
therefore, the Court seems to be suggesting some role in the punitive
damages analysis for “similar” conduct that harms multiple persons not
before the court, but firmly cautions against actually punishing such
conduct or permitting such factors to justify an otherwise excessive
award. In other words, State Farm may be interpreted as holding that a
court may not actually punish a defendant for harm to others, but may
take such harm into account in calculating a punitive damages award in
the case of a particular plaintiff “similarly” harmed. This may make
some sense, but courts and juries will likely experience great confusion
and uncertainty as they tread the fine line between “relevant” harm that
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1523 (2003).
Id. at 1523-24.
Id. at 1523.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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may be taken into account and the prohibition against actually punishing
that conduct.
Moreover, to the extent the Court has chosen to limit punishment of
a defendant’s conduct based solely on the harm to the plaintiff, it may
ultimately balk at setting aggregate punitive damages limitations. If
every mass tort punitive damages award is properly and constitutionally
calculated to punish only the harm to a particular plaintiff, then it would
seem every mass tort plaintiff could recover punitive damages awards
for the same conduct – because prior plaintiffs would only have been
awarded punitive damages based on their own harm. Again, this may be
a workable approach to preventing excessive aggregate punitive
damages awards in mass tort cases, but it may also tolerate high punitive
damages awards in each case (based on a reprehensibility analysis that
includes “similar” harms) that in aggregate produce excessive punitive
damages awards. In any event, given the lower courts’ frequent
encounters with such mass tort cases and the thorny issues such cases
raise,198 it seems highly likely the Court will one day be forced to
address more squarely the aggregate punishment problem and provide
greater guidance.
IV. CONCLUSION
The rightful function of punitive damages in punishing and
deterring tortfeasors guilty of extraordinary wrongs has been a source of
disagreement among American judges and legal scholars since early in
the nineteenth century.199 The requirement that punitive damages should
be reasonably proportional to the seriousness of a defendant’s offense is
deeply rooted in common law torts jurisprudence.200 Recent Supreme
Court decisions subjecting state court punitive damage awards to
constitutional scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, however, have interjected a new and perplexing dimension
to this longstanding debate.
In applying the tenets of the modern concept of due process to the
frequent and often large punitive damage awards imposed by state courts
198. See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003)
(upholding identical $186,000 punitive damages awards for two plaintiffs in bedbug infested hotel,
and recognizing likely jury calculation of damages based on the 191 rooms in the hotel); In re
Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. Alaska 2004) (imposing $4.5 billion punitive damages
award in mandatory class action).
199. PROSSER & KEATON, TORTS 9-10 (5th ed. 1984).
200. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 478 (1993) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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today, the Court has found it necessary to create a substantial new body
of constitutional law.201 The Court has insisted on reliable state judicial
review processes to correct arbitrary or excessive awards, examined
critically state courts’ justifications for imposing punitive damages, and
announced a complicated set of standards for assessing whether the size
of a specific punitive damage award is excessive.
This article has sought to describe and explain the series of cases
through which this new constitutional analysis has evolved, focusing in
particular on the impact of the State Farm case, the Court’s most recent
incursion into this dense thicket of punitive damage principles and
procedures. Although the Court obviously intended State Farm to
clarify past ambiguities and provide practical guidance to lower courts
considering punitive damage claims, an examination of a number of
recent lower court cases reveal that it fell seriously short in this
endeavor. Moreover, State Farm raises new questions about the
demands of due process in the context of punitive damages, and it fails
to address several important issues left unresolved by its earlier cases.
Even after State Farm, the Court’s application of due process norms to
punitive damages remains very much a work in progress.

201. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 24-28 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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